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(Corollary) Objects with Nichtsein (i.e., without Sein) have Sosein.
An important thesis, implicit throughout [26] , is enunciated in Meinong's later work, Uber Moglichkeit Thesis (M7), together with the fact that there is no qualitative difference between the Soseins of objects which have Sein and those which don't, permits an account of the uniformity of thought and language with respect to fact and fiction. Next, (M8) Some objects are incomplete.
An object o is incomplete iff there is a property F such that o is neither F nor not F ([29]: 168ff, esp. p. 178).
A special case of incomplete objects is a finite object, which has a finite number of properties.7 By taking a and b to be incomplete objects each of which lacks some property had by the other, we can meet the non-substitutability criterion discussed in Section I. This enables us to supply "referents" for all "non-referring" expressions and, perhaps, provide for an "objectual" reading of "substitutional" quantification (see [37] for details). This is an extremely interesting and provocative theory; however, it has some drawbacks. Besides the problem of the infinite regress, there remains the ever-present urge to say that, in some yet-to-be-explicated sense, objects must "be there" in order for them to be non-committally quantified over and to be objects of psychological acts (i.e., to come into pseudo-existence; cf. n. 8 Thus, when I think of a phoenix and when I think of President Carter, substantially the same analyses can be given of these two psychological experiences, up to a point. There is an act (thinking), a content (which "directs" the act to the object), and a Meinongian object in each case; in the latter case, there is, in addition, the actual, physical object, viz., President Carter. Since the actual object does not always enter the picture, so to speak, we may call this an ACO(O') analysis, representing the actual object by "O"' and indicating with parentheses the possibility that there is not always an actual object corresponding to a Meinongian object. I now turn to several reasons that may be adduced for this move.
however, it will remain an important part of the modified theory that there are two modes of predication. While the notion that there is more than one way for a subject to possess a property is most likely traceable back to Aristotle's Categories, the first fully developed theory embodying two copulas is that of Castanieda ([2]). His "internal" predication corresponds roughly to what I shall call "constituency" below, and his ''external'' predication serves to associate pairs of ''guises" (which correspond very roughly to Meinongian objects) with "sameness relations" such as identity or "consubstantiation." (For more historical remarks, see [37] (5B) not-[Mo(the golden mountain, being in Asia)].
Of course, what has been presented so far is only the skeleton of a theory. We must say exactly what Mo is. For the time being, however, it will suffice to characterize Mo as linking a property and an item which has that property as a constituent in some sense. But corresponding to an item such as the golden mountain, there is the set of its properties (its Sosein); so (4B) may be explicated as:
being golden E {P: P is a property of the golden mountain}.
Let us call Mo. constituency, reading 'Mo(x, y)' as "y is a constituent of x" and writing 'y c x' on occasion. Ml will be called exemplification, with 'Ml(x,y)' to be read "x exemplifies y" and written 'x ex y'.
We have, then, two modes of predication, i.e., two ways for properties to "attach" to things which they characterizetwo ways for properties to characterize them.12 Now, when But there is no relevant qualitative difference between these two acts of thinking. So in the latter case there is also an M-object. For otherwise we would always be able to distinguish between the experiences of thinking of an existent and thinking of a non-existent by merely deciding whether the object of our thought were actual or Meinongian. And this we cannot do.'3 All objects of thought, then, are of the same type. But the type cannot be that of actual objects, since non-existents aren't actual. So the type must be that of M-objects. The object of thought, whether it exists or not, is an M-object, and M-objects are of a different type from actual objects. 14 The ability of thought to be directed to both existents and non-existents can be accounted for by taking M-objects to be the only objects of thought. Since to each actual object, O', which exemplifies (inter alia) P, there corresponds an M-object, 0, which is constituted (perhaps inter alia) by P, we can refer to or think about O ' by referring to or thinking about its Meinongian counterpart 0.
5. Blueprints, Maps, and Models. It might be of some help in clarifying the nature of the type-distinction to consider several analogies.
The first analogy is based on a model of knowledge presented in Strawson [41] : 56. Essentially, the model is a card file; each card represents an object of our knowledge and is inscribed with names of the properties each object has. If we now extend this model by imagining the card file standing amidst a certain collection of actual (e.g., physical) objects, we obtain our analogy. The cards are the analogues of M-objects, and 'F c o' is interpreted as "'F' is inscribed on card o". Furthermore, to each actual object about which we have some knowledge, there corresponds at least one card, and to some cards there corresponds at least one actual object.
A similar analogy, perhaps bringing out more clearly the relationship between exemplification and constituency, is that of the scale model. Consider a scale model of a train, exact in every detail, so to speak. Now, there are two items to consider: the model, T, and the actual train, T'. Pointing to T, we can say "It weighs 4 tons" and "It weighs 4 pounds." But "it" "has" those properties in two different ways. It (T) exemplifies the property of weighing 4 pounds, since it is an actual object itself. But, as the M-object-analogue, it is "constituted" by, or represents, the property of weighing 4 tons. T', on the other hand, exemplifies the property of weighing 4 tons, as an actual object which corresponds to T.
Other features of the type-distinction can be elicited by considering an analogy with blueprints. A blueprint of a house is to an M-object as a house of which it is a blueprint is to an actual object corresponding to the M-object. Just as the house need never be built or many houses may be built from the one blueprint, so there might be no or many actual objects correlated with an M-object. The interesting feature of this analogy is that, just as we can think of impossible objects, so can there be "impossible blueprints", i.e., blueprints of items which could not possibly be constructed because they would have to exemplify contradictory properties. 15 An important characteristic of the cardfile and blueprint M-object-analogues is that they are, in principle, incomplete and, in fact, finite; no blueprint of a house specifies which bricks to use. 
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Note that we need a version of the Law of Contradiction together with a "non-logical" or structural law (a "meaning postulate," in effect), viz., (7), to get the "implied" result that (R, S ) doesn't exist. However, the Law of Contradiction is not applied to an M-object, but only within the realm of actual objects. It is the fact that it applies there (together with (7) Since there are two modes of predication, an objective like x is F is ambiguous, and so (So*) is essentially disjunctive. 16 (by (ii) ). iff o is (or, corresponds to) an individual correlate, i.e.,  iff o is (or, corresponds to) {F1, . . . , F.}  is a core, c{Fl, . . . , FI} is a guise. Here, c is a " Here, "some" includes the Leibnizian guise at the top of the semi-lattice (though not (necessarily) the "quasi-Leibnizian" guises which "point" to it; cf. [9]: 72f). So when a change occurs, one diachronic physical object disappears and is replaced by another.
From (So*), we can infer that the golden mountain is golden (by (i)), that the tallest mountain is a mountain (by (i) or (ii)), that the present King of France is not bald (by (i)), and that the tallest mountain is in Asia
In our theory, on the other hand, actual objects turn out to be very much like bare substrates, having merely external relations to properties. On our theory, if an actual object a changes a property, we keep a and locate the change in its (external) relationships to M-objects. Thus,
3a[a SC x (at t) & -a SC x (at t')].
But it is the same a.
Castafieda distinguishes, as noted above, between "internal" and "external" modes of predication. The former links guises with the properties in their cores, and it is sufficiently like our constituency mode of predication to be acceptable.
External predication, on the other hand, is not the expected direct link between a guise and non-core properties, although it is the method whereby the link is forged (cf. [2]: 13; [9]: 75). Thus, it differs from our exemplification-the mode in which properties are predicated of actual objects. Nor is it, pace Parsons ([33]: 569 n. 14), the predication of "extranuclear" properties.
Consider the blue pen on my desk, i.e., c {B, P, D } or (B ,P, D ). If it doesn't exist, then there is no need to account for, say its being a Bic (because it isn't a Bic). But if the blue pen on my desk, i.e., c{B, P, D} or (B, P, D), does exist (i.e., is selfconsubstantiated or has a Sein-correlate, respectively), then either it is a Bic or it isn't. Suppose it is; then it is linked with the property of being a Bic. Castafieda's guise is so linked by being consubstantiated with c{B, P, D, being-a-Bic}; the M-object is so linked by having a Sein-correlate in common with (being a Bic).
Finally, Castafieda's external predication connects pairs of guises to a few "external predicables," 17 That is, two guises are consubstantiated iff (the Mobject-analogue of) each has the same, unique Sein-correlate. It is a straightforward task to show that (A*) satisfies all the laws of consubstantiation. For instance, x exists iff C*xx, i.e., iff 3!a[a SC x], which is quite a different concept of existence from ours. The important feature of (A*), however, is that while it is an isomorphism, it is not a reduction of one theory to another. Indeed, it can't be, given the differences between guises and M-objects (e.g., our a is much like a substrate; and, for Castafieda, no singleton guise exists, in general, since (the M-object-analogue of) each such guise usually has more than one Sein-correlate). for convenience, let us name these 'SSC' and 'SSC', respectively.
We arrive at Clark's paradox by first assuming that (SSC), i.e., the M-object whose sole constituting property is that of being a non-self-Sein-correlate, exemplifies SSC. That means that (SSCU) exemplifies all of its constituting properties, and so (SSC) ex SSC. That, in turn, means that (SSTC)fails to exemplify one of its constituting properties, and so ex SSC), yielding a contradiction. The alternative assumption, that (SSC) does not exemplify SSC, entails that (SSC) fails to exemplify one of its constituting properties, and so-((SSC) ex SSC). But then (SSC) must exemplify all of its constituting properties, and so it exemplifies SSC, again a contradiction. Therefore, (SSC) both does and does not exemplify SSC, which violates the Law of Contradiction (ALCla). The difficulty in determining the nature of such an object of thought led Meinong to call it a "defective" object, and he suggested that such "objects" lacked Aussersein: "In this case one is not really confronted with an object, and experiences of apprehension in this instance lack a proper object" ( A second lesson is that if we do not wish to abandon the entire system, but rather to repair it, then there are three weak spots to be looked after. There are three major ways to block the paradox (short of tampering ith the nature of exemplification): The first is to deny that SSC is a property. This can be done in several ways:
First, one can hold that `' is not a property-forming operator. But it is in some cases, and, in the absence of a general criterion, independent of this paradox, for determining when it is and when it isn't such an operator, this move seems weak.
Second, one might deny that there are complex properties. By doing so, we are able to deny that there is in Aussersein such an M-object as (SSC) (for the simple reason that there is no such property as SSC) without placing a limitation on the possible objects of thought. But, while it is easy to deny that where F and G are properties, there is also the complex property F & G, it is not so easy to deny the complex property F v G (or the M-object (F v G)) and even harder to see how can be "reduced" to its "constituents" (or what M-object would correspond to such a reduction). Moreover, there are some systems of formal ontology in which there are complex properties (cf. Cocchiarella [14] : 166).
Third, it might be held that not every "well-formed propositional form" yields a property (cf. Grossmann [19] : 160, Cocchiarella [14] : 169). But this seems to be the case for impredicative properties-ones whose definitions somehow involve an "illegitimate totality"-and it is not clear that SSC is or need be thus defined. For, while the definition of SSC involves quantification over all properties, it might be reconstruable in terms of bounded quantification over all properties of an antecedently given and well-defined kind. Should this not be possible, then this way out of the paradox is perhaps the most promising. Yet it is not immediately clear how it would account for the apparent fact that we can think of (S). 19 The second major way to black the paradox is to deny that M-objects are actual, for then they would not exemplify any properties. This move would require an alternative way, such as Castafieda ' Nor, indeed, does it matter whether exemplification is the appropriate (sort of) relation, nor even whether constituency is. Whatever the mode of predication of properties to the M-objects which are, so to say, "constituted" by them, and zwhatever the mode of predication of properties to M-objects which, so to say, "exemplify" them, the paradox can be seen to remain.
It might prove helpful at this point to see how the paradox applies to the analogues of Section 111.5. A blueprint which exemplified all of its constituting properties might be a three-dimensional, life-sized, scale model (though, in this connection, recall my remarks about life-sized maps). But no blueprint can be constituted by such a property as SS, so no paradox arises. A file card can exemplify all of its inscribed properties, but no card can exemplify such a property as SSC, so no paradox arises here, either. However, for M-objects, it seems that they can be constituted by and exemplify SSC (indeed, if anything can exemplify such a property, M-objects can).
The third way out, reminiscent of Meinong's move, is to modify the Principle of Freedom of Assumption.20 Instead of saying that any object can be thought of (or, more precisely, that for any property, there is an M-object constituted by that property), we could say that for any two (distinct) properties, there is an M-object that distingushes between them; i.e.,
VFVF'[F ?F' --3o[F co &F' to]]
There is, then, no longer any guarantee that (SSC) is an M-object; indeed, it is not, on pain of paradox. Given the property SSC and any other property, say, F', the most we can claim is that there is an M-object, m, constituted by SSC inter alia (and not by F'). Let (SSC,G) be one such m. By running the argument of the last section, we can conclude that m does not exemplify SSC, on pain of contradiction. But there is no paradox, since we can choose G to be such that m does not exemplify G. Of course, this undercuts a fundamental, and perhaps the most reasonable, Meinongian assumption-that we can think of anything. In defense of this way out, however, we might say that what's true is: we only think that we can think of anything! (Cf. [30] : 20, quoted above.)
If this were the end of the matter, we might rest content. But the Russell-Clark paradox is of considerable philosophical interest. First let us see how it applies to Parsons' and Castafieda's systems.
As noted, Parsons has only one mode of predication, but he has two kinds of properties. In [35] , we learn that each nuclear property, p, has an extranuclear image, ?p = {x: p E x}, and thatx has ?p iffx E ?p. To set up the paradox, then, we want to consider the following properties, which we shall name 'PSSC' and 'PSSC', respectively:
KxVF[F E X -X E F]

Ax3F[F Ex & x E 8F]
(Note that to be able to say that o is PSSC, we need to assume, with Parsons, that all individuals are objects.) Consider now the object {PSSC}. To do this, we must assume that FSSC is a nuclear property; if it is not nuclear, then there appears to be an untenable limitation in Parsons' theory on what can be thought.
That is, g is consubstantiated with a guise which is, CSSC. Hence, g iSE CSSC, contradicting our assumption.
There is, however, a way out of this seeming paradox, for both assumptions (g iSE CSSC, g iSE CSSC) imply that g exists (i.e., is self-consubstantiated). Thus, the proper interpretation of these contradictions is, simply, that g does not exist, for in that case it is not the case that g iSE CSSC or CSSC (or"anything else). However, preliminary investigation indicates that the paradox affects other, non-Meinongian theories, such as the adverbial theory of mental phenomena and even Frege's theory of sense and reference (see [38] ). Moreover, the ways out suggested above do not appear applicable in these other cases. Rather than give up such theories in a wholesale way, it behooves us to search more deeply for the source of the trouble. 22 
